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Incorrect Valve Led to Deadly Engine Room Fire

Maritime Activity Reports, Inc.

February 23, 2025

Circled area identifying the open section of fuel vent piping (left) and cut out placed back in position after the fire (right). (Source: NTSB)

Circled area identifying the open section of fuel vent piping (left) and cut out placed back in position after the fire (right). (Source: NTSB)

The installation of an incorrect valve in a pipe to a diesel oil tank led to a fatal fire aboard a cargo vessel docked in LaPorte, Texas, an National Transportation Safety Board shows.

On Jan. 8, 2024, a fire broke out in the engine room aboard the cargo vessel Stride during bunkering, or fueling, operations while docked at the Barbours Cut Marine Terminal. The fire self-extinguished after crewmembers shut down all ventilation to the engine room. Two crewmembers died as a result of the fire and one was seriously injured. The vessel was declared a total loss valued at $12 million.

Six weeks before the fire, a replacement valve was ordered for the ship’s port double bottom diesel oil, or DBDO, tank. After the fire, investigators discovered the installed valve was not the same type of valve specified by the vessel’s fuel oil system drawing. Rather than an angle stop valve, a similar looking angle stop check valve, which allows diesel oil to flow in only one direction, even when open, was ordered and installed instead.

As a result of the incorrect valve installation, once diesel oil filled another tank to capacity during bunkering, the diesel oil was directed up the common vent line, rather than the port (or intended) DBDO tank, where it flowed from a small cut out section of the vent pipe that had been sealed at an unknown time. The flexible sealing and tape covering the cut out failed, and diesel oil poured down into the engine room and onto operating machinery, causing a fire.

Contributing to the overfilling of the diesel oil tank was engine crewmembers not monitoring the levels of the tanks being filled aboard the vessel, as required by the bunkering procedure in the operating company’s safety management system.

The company’s bunkering procedures required a minimum of two engineering officers and two engine ratings to be on duty during bunkering operations. However, at the time of the fire, only three engineering crewmembers (two engineering officers and one engine rating) were involved with bunkering operations.

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